The Hidden Tax of Jury Service by Taylor, Lori L.
The Hidden Tax 
of Jury Service 
LORI L. TAYLOR 
Director, Mosbacher Institute 
VOLUME 6 | ISSUE 5 | 2015 
Not all taxes are conveniently labeled as such. For 
example, consider jury duty. Although it is seldom 
discussed in these terms, jury duty clearly fits the textbook 
definition of a tax—jurors are required to surrender a 
valuable asset (their time) to the government with little or 
no personal benefit. In the colorful words of former budget 
director Richard Darman, “if it looks like a duck, walks 
like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck.”  
As a tax, jury duty has a 
number of undesirable fea-
tures. First, although all 
Americans share equally in 
the benefits of an effective 
legal system, the obliga-
tions of jury duty are not 
equally distributed among 
them. Whole classes of ca-
pable individuals are ex-
cused from service because 
of their age or occupation,1 
and the burdens of service 
vary dramatically accord-
ing to the state and county 
of residence (see chart). 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Jury duty is a tax that is 
unnecessarily high. 
 
Increased transparency would 
give judges an incentive to 
conserve juror time. 
 
Juror pay should be raised to 
something approaching a 
market wage. 
 
Jury fees for civil trials should 
reflect the real cost of hiring the 
jury and should rise as the 
length of the trial increases. 
 
2 For example, New Yorkers are more than 
twice as likely as Californians to serve jury 
duty in a US district court. If you live in New 
York City, you are more than twice as likely to 
serve on a jury than if you live in Buffalo or 
just outside the city in Westchester.2 
Some workers are insured against the costs of 
jury duty because their firms continue to pay 
them while they serve, but other workers 
must bear the full burden themselves. Fur-
thermore, in states where the jury pool is 
drawn primarily from lists of registered vot-
ers, jury duty is a tax on voting that discour-
ages public participation in the political pro-
cess.3 
Perhaps the most unattractive feature of the 
jury duty tax, however, is that it is unneces-
sarily high. In fact, the jury system seems al-
most designed to squander juror time. Jurors 
twiddle their thumbs in the jury room while 
the judge resolves a sticky legal issue for an-
other trial or indulges the attorneys in yet an-
other sidebar discussion. Artificially low fees 
for jury trials encourage litigants to opt for a 
trial before a jury rather than a judge. Time-
honored administrative procedures prolong 
jury service and increase the number of jurors 
required for each trial. 
The system does not conserve juror time for 
one simple reason—from the perspective of 
the courthouse, jurors are practically free. 
Thus, the key to lowering the tax burden of 
jury duty is changing the perspective of the 
courts regarding juror costs. If the consumers 
of juries (the judges, lawyers, and litigants) 
were responsible for the real costs of juror 
time, then they would have every incentive to 
use it as sparingly as possible.  
JUROR CONSCRIPTION 
Eliminating juror conscription and replacing 
it with a voluntary system wherein jurors are 
paid a market wage would make the courts 
directly responsible for the costs of juror time 
and would resolve many of the tax-incidence 
problems associated with the current system 
of jury duty. Unfortunately, the resulting ju-
ries would not represent a cross-section of 
the community and, therefore, would not fit 
the traditional definition of a “jury of one’s 
peers.” If we want to retain this feature of the 
legal system, juror conscription is probably 
unavoidable. However, there are a number of 
ways to induce a court system based on jury 
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From the perspective 
of the courthouse, 
jurors are practically 
free. 
Figure 1: The Likelihood of Paying the Jury Tax 
(Federal jurors as a share of the voting-age population—
2012) 
Source: United States  Courts: Judicial Business 2012, 
Statistical Tables—US District Courts—Grand and Petit 
Juror; and the United States Census Bureau 
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duty to behave more like a system based on 
voluntary jurors. 
REFLECTING REAL COSTS 
One strategy is to raise juror pay to something 
approaching a market wage. Currently, every 
state and federal court pays jurors less than 
the minimum wage.4 Paying jurors more real-
istic wages would increase the fairness of the 
jury system and force the courts to more fully 
acknowledge the value of the services they 
receive from jurors. From the court’s perspec-
tive, the price of a typical jury’s time would be 
approximately equal to the price expected 
under a voluntary system. Thus, the courts 
would face nearly the same incentive to con-
serve juror time (on average) and less juror 
time would be wasted. 
Another strategy is to provide judges with 
direct incentives to conserve juror time. Of all 
the officers of the court, judges are in the best 
position to respond to such incentives be-
cause they have legal authority to set reasona-
ble time limits for cases in their courts. Fur-
thermore, the National Center for State Courts 
found that variations in trial length arise pri-
marily from the personal habits of judges and 
attorneys rather than from the nature of the 
cases or the evidence.5 Therefore, incentives 
aimed at judges are likely to be particularly 
effective.  
Putting judges on a juror budget would be an 
obvious way to achieve this objective, but it is 
not the only one. Publishing detailed records 
on their jury utilization would also give judges 
an incentive to conserve juror time. Not only 
would publication bring social pressure to 
bear on judicial spendthrifts (particularly in 
states where judges are elected), but it would 
also give judges a benchmark against which to 
measure their jury efficiency. We know that 
providing physicians with information about 
the treatment practices of their peers causes 
them to reduce unnecessary treatments.6 By 
the same logic, providing judges with infor-
mation about the jury practices of their peers 
should help them to reduce unnecessary jury 
time. At the very least, publishing information 
on jury utilization would eliminate the stealth 
dimension of the jury duty tax and advance 
the attractive principle of no taxation without 
documentation. 
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE INTERESTS 
An equally important strategy for reducing 
the jury duty tax is to make civil litigants fully 
responsible for the additional costs of a jury 
trial. Unlike criminal trials, which serve pri-
marily the public interest, civil trials serve 
primarily the private interests of the parties 
involved. Therefore, it is hard to argue that 
the public should subsidize private litigation 
by keeping jury fees artificially low. Rather 
than being nominal and fixed (for example, 
civil litigants who request a jury trial in a Tex-
as county court pay a jury fee of $30), jury 
fees for civil trials should reflect the effective 
cost of hiring the jury and should rise as the 
length of the trial increases. To discourage 
excessive use of juries, litigants should be 
charged market wages for juror time even if 
the jurors themselves are essentially unpaid. 
Incentives aimed at 
judges are likely to be 
particularly effective. 
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Notes 
1 For example, citizens over age 70, students, and primary 
caretakers of young children and invalids are automatically 
exempt from jury duty in Texas. While persons eligible for 
exemption may voluntarily serve on juries in Texas, voluntary 
service cannot be considered a tax. 
2 Second Annual Report Pursuant to Section 528 of the 
Judiciary Law 2011–2012. Retrieved from https://
www.nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/528Report2011_12.pdf 
3 Preller, A (2012). Jury duty is a poll tax: The case for severing 
the link between voter registration and jury service. Columbia 
Journal of Law and Social Problems, Fall, 46(1). http://
www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Fall2012/Preller.pdf  
4 The National Center for State Courts. Jury Management 
database. 
5 Sipes, D., et al. (1988). On trial: The length of civil and criminal 
trials. National Center for State Courts. 
6 Keller, R., Soule, D., Wennberg, J., and Hanley, D. (1990). 
Dealing with geographic variations in the use of hospitals. The 
Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery, 72(9), pp. 1286-93.  
7 Gryphon, M. (2011). Assessing the effects of a ‘loser pays’ rule 
on the American legal system: An economic analysis and 
proposal for reform. Rutgers Journal of Law and Public Policy ,  
8(3), pp. 567-613. 
It is tempting to also require that the loser in 
any civil trial pays all of the associated jury 
costs. After all, an experiment in Florida’s 
state courts suggests that a loser-pays sys-
tem of civil litigation reduces the number of 
trials.7 However, the loser-pays system 
could also encourage greater legal expendi-
tures for cases that do go to trial. Therefore, 
a loser-pays requirement could lead to few-
er but longer civil cases. Because the net ef-
fect on juror time is unclear, it is probably 
best to leave the distribution of jury costs to 
the discretion of the judge. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Jury duty is a tax that is unnecessarily high. 
As long as the court system considers jurors 
a free good, it will remain unnecessarily 
high. Fortunately, a few simple reforms can 
raise the price of jurors from the court’s per-
spective and, thereby, use market forces to 
cut the tax.  
Duck hunting anyone? 
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To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
http://bit.ly/1ABajdH  
